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Abstract
Inequality is rising in the United States. One of the possible ramifications of this trend
could be a shift in the political landscape over the next couple decades. In particular,
Americans could become more divided politically on class-based lines due to the
economic strain put on the working class. Using data from the University of Mary
Washington’s Center for Leadership and Media Studies’ 2014 Survey, this paper strives
to explore the current landscape of class-based politics. First, it explores if class-based
politics are still salient in Virginia by examining if there is a correlation between an
individuals’ self-defined class and various political beliefs. If not, then it explores why
class-based politics do not affect political choices.

Over the course of the last 25 years, the United States has seen an increase in
inequality. The Gini coefficient, an oft-used measurement of inequality, shows the
United States moving toward a more unequal society. The Congressional Budget Office
found the Gini coefficient “rose from 0.48 in 1979 to 0.59 in 2007,” and the United
States Census Bureau found the Gini coefficient rose from 0.40 in the 1979s to 0.47 in
2010 (Dadush 2012: 6). Accompanying the rise in inequality are “worrying factors” like
“increased prevalence of poverty, increased macroeconomic instability,” and increased
spending on “positional goods” (Dadush 2012: 25). But there are other ramifications
from increased inequality as well.
Politicians have started to notice the growth of income inequality in the United
States and have begun to respond accordingly, often striking a more populist tone that
speaks to the working class. Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush, who is currently the
top polling candidate in numerous GOP 2016 presidential primary polls (e.g. Agiesta
2015, ABC News/Washington Post 2015), said in a speech in Detroit recently: “The
opportunity gap is the defining issue of our time. More Americans are stuck at their
income levels than ever before. It’s very hard for people to go from the bottom rungs of
the economy to the top or even the middle. This should alarm you. It has alarmed me”
(Vox 2015).
Former Secretary of State and 2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton has talked about income inequality as well. In her 2016 presidential
announcement, Clinton said: “Americans have fought their way back from tough
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economic times. But the deck is still stacked in favor of those at the top. Everyday
Americans need a champion” (Clinton 2015).
But because American politicians are speaking about an issue does not
necessarily mean the issue matters to ordinary Americans. This purpose of this paper is
to find if American politicians are correct in assuming the growth of inequality matters to
Americans when deciding their political beliefs. To do so, the paper will explore if there
is a correlation between self-defined class in Virginians and their basic political opinions.
If so, it will explore why there is the correlation. If not, it will explore why the correlation
does not exist.
After all, the implications of the class can have drastic effects. In 2014 alone,
United States candidates for public office spent $3,665,416,368 on elections, a number
that has increased dramatically over the last decade (Open Secrets 2014). A better
understanding of the effect of class on voting would have huge consequences for
campaign microtargeting, not to mention shape the way Americans view politics and the
actors therein.
History of Class
Class has affected American society since colonial times. One of the most
striking examples of pre-revolutionary class was the Deep South. Antebellum
southerners were divided into very clear groups based on their income (and, as was the
norm at the time, the color of one’s skin): the landed aristocracy; the poor, but free,
yeoman; and the enslaved African-Americans. Many of America’s Founding Fathers
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came from this system in Virginia and were slave-owners themselves: George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison (Greene 2000).
Frontier America became an important breeding ground of a different type of
class system. Free land for free men set up a system in which all those who moved
west started as equals, no one had a past. Life on the plains was difficult, which meant
that settlers often had to rely on one another. These factors led to the American West
being fairly egalitarian. This egalitarianism, coupled with a strong hatred of the northeast
and the railroad barons, led to the rise of Prairie Populism in the mid-19th century
(Hicks 1961, Peffer and Argersinger 1991).
The history of class identification in the United States is not free of violence. Like
other countries, the United States has seen its fair share of political infighting over class
issues. One of the most significant class based event in United States history was the
Haymarket affair. Following three days of strikes and the killing of two striking workers in
Chicago on May 3, 1884, union and socialist leaders called for strikes in Haymarket
Square. The next day, the protesters assembled and rallied until the police came to
break up the crowd. Shortly after the lead officer called for the rally to stop, someone
threw and bomb in front of the police and gunfire broke out. The ensuing violence left 11
dead and many more wounded (David 1958).
Even as recently as 2011, the United States saw a fight over economic injustice.
The national Occupy movement, which started as the Occupy Wall Street movement,
had a very populist message. It highlighted the struggles of the working and middle
class, calling on political leaders to change policies in support of these classes.
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Occupy’s catchphrase “We are the 99%,” as opposed to the wealthy “1%,” lent itself to
the lower classes and their struggle. (Calhoun 2013)
Like most class-based demonstrations in the United States, neither the
Haymarket affair nor the Occupy movement made any immediate changes to the
socioeconomic landscape. However, as a consequence of the Haymarket affair, the
United States moved a step closer to an eight-hour workday (David 1958). Occupy, on
the other hand, so far has had less time for its consequences to percolate.
What is social class?
America is divided into classes, different rungs on a socioeconomic ladder, but
how does one define a class? What does it mean if someone is working class? Or
middle class? In order to determine one’s class, many different factors need to be taken
into account: income, access to capital, position in society, etc. Then, one must look at
the effect of how these different factors affect one another and which ones matter most.
Perhaps the most internationally influential class theory is Karl Marx’s theory of
class. Marx argued that all class is derived from one’s position in the means of
production. He wrote that human social organization started around the satisfaction of
basic human needs, meaning society is organized around the production of goods that
fulfill those needs- the economy. Marx defines two distinct classes based on his theory
of social organization and its relationship with the means of production: the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie. The proletariat produces goods that fulfill human needs and are
therefore employed by others, and the bourgeoisie are the owners of the means of
productions and can purchase the labor of others- the proletariat. Of course, Marx
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ultimately wanted the self-identification of the proletariat, which, he argued, would lead
to the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867).
In opposition to Marx’s economic basis of class was Max Weber’s stratified
theory of societal order. Weber argued there was more to societal order than economic
position alone. In fact, Weber asserted society divides itself into three groups: classes,
status groups, and parties. According to Weber, classes are “bases for communal
action,” not “communities.” Essentially, classes are just groups of people that have the
common “life chances.” That is, their economic situation in terms of “possession of
goods and opportunities for income” is similar. Communities, he argues, arrange
themselves into hierarchies and people fit themselves into these hierarchies, which
often do not depend on an individuals’ class or property ownership. By parties, Weber
does not refer to the modern, American idea of political parties. Instead, he defined
parties as groups that acquire “social power,” which is the ability for an individual to
have their desires met despite opposition. These determinants create a pliable system
of societal order, which changes depending on the circumstances of the time (Weber,
Gerth, and Mills 1946, Bendix 1960).
It has been 131 years since Karl Marx’s death, and 94 years since Max Weber’s,
but the definition of class remains unsolved. Since Marx and Weber’s death, class
theorists have moved beyond their definition of classes but have kept the roots of their
ideas.
Some theorists retained Marx’s idea of a society split between two social classes,
but they argue these classes have decomposed into subclasses (Dahrendorf 1959,
5

Wright 1985). Neo-Marxists argue the “decomposition of labor” is why Marx’s working
class revolution has not happened. The working class (proletariat) cannot be seen as a
wholly singular group anymore (Dahrendorf 1959). For example, these workers could be
divided into three independent groups: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled (Clark and
Lipset 1991).
Other theorists have diverged from Marx’s system of classes by creating
multilevel systems, which compensate for Marx’s broad class definitions. For example,
Erik Wright broke Marx’s two-category system into a 12-category system. His model
includes groups going from proletariat to bourgeoisie, with categories such as small
employers and top managers in between (Wright 1985).
Other theorists base their ideas on Weberian theory. In the context of America as
a post-industrial state, these theories break up societies into different groups that play a
stronger or weaker role, depending on the situation. For example, the idea of traditional
classes has been broken up because a rise of new issue-based groups: religion,
gender, race, etc. (Heath 1991). Others even argue that new forms of social classes are
emerging. For example, as income rises, traditional hierarchies and collectivism are
weakened. A weakening of these traditional models of societal order has led to an
increased sense of individualism. However, Americans still need something around
which to coalesce, which has led to new an increase in the relevance of non-class
based strata (Clark and Lipset 1991).
Class Salience in a Modern Context
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Even if one can settle on one definition of class, there is the issue of class’s
salience in contemporary, American society. Does socioeconomic class still affect
Americans’ decision-making and what effect, if any, will it have in the future?
Unsurprisingly, seeing as they cannot decide on a universal definition of class, theorists
do not agree on whether class remains a salient part of Americans’ lives.
One argument is that traditional, economic-based hierarchies are declining.
These hierarchies support traditional socioeconomic classes by reaffirming “classdefined patterns in informal social relations, cultural outlooks, and support for social
change” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 402). Large class divisions are caused by great
differentiation between classes in society, and conversely, small class divisions are
caused by small divisions between classes in society. However, the divisions among
classes in society need not be income based. Like in Weberian theory, the
differentiation can come from differences in status or power as well. For example, a
society could be sharply divided into two classes (producers and owners) and have
relatively similar income levels, but the classes are still bitterly divided (Clark and Lipset
1991).
The converse of both the above rules applies as well. If differentiation of
traditional hierarchies declines, social classes decrease in relevance as well. For
example, a society with little differentiation between its societal groups will likely have
little class activity. However, the decrease in class conflict does not equate to less
conflict overall. Conflict, instead, is organized around other issues (e.g. social issues
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and race). Moreover, the less divided the classes are, the less likely that different
groups would have distinct cultural differences (Clark and Lipset 1991).
The growth of the American economy has weakened traditional hierarchies,
which, in turn, has weakened the traditional class system in America. Over the past one
hundred years, the United States has emerged as the world’s sole superpower,
meaning more affluence for all Americans, and the creation of an expansive social
safety net As a result, many Americans can worry less than their ancestors did about
material interests. More affluence has meant lower class Americans are not as reliant
on material support from the upper class, which has led to a decrease in class
consciousness and, as a consequence, a rise in individualism (Clark and Lipset 1991).
If a rise in affluence is what is fueling a breakdown in class consciousness in the
United States, then rising economic inequality in the United States may soon break the
trend. Economic inequality is rising in the United States, and the amount of taxes and
governmental transfers that bring down inequality have also dropped. (Dadush 2012).
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Figure 1
(Dadush 2012: 10)

Other, not-as-obvious variables are affecting how Americans view class as well.
Variables like increased technological innovation, immigration and its effect on
nepotism, and declining familial hierarchies have brought down the rates of class
consciousness in the United States. In fact, the more societal hierarchies decline, the
more traditional class identities decline (Clark and Lipset 1991).
Despite all the indications that social classes should be less prevalent in today’s
society, research indicates that American’s self-identification of class has not changed
drastically, although there has been modest change in favor of the middle class. In
1949, 49% of Americans identified themselves as part of the working class and 45%
self-identified as members of the middle class (Centers 1949). By 2000, the number of
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Americans who identified as members of the middle class had risen to 59% and the
number of Americans who identified as members of the working class had fallen to
41%1 (Hout 2007). Although these numbers show a growth in the middle class, they
also indicate that class-consciousness is not dead in the United States, as a significant
portion of the population still identifies with the working class.
But self-identifying with a social class does not conclusively mean that an
American belongs to that class. For the most part, Americans understand social classes
and can explain each class properly, although the term “working class” must often be
prompted, likely because Americans would otherwise think of themselves as middle
class (Hout 2007). However, Americans are not particularly good at naming their correct
social class. Although a majority of working class Americans correctly identify their
social class, “a substantial percentage inflates their class” (Sosnaud, Brady, and Frenk
2013: 90), half of middle class voters also have correctly correlate their perceived social
class with their actual social class. However, upper-middle class voters overwhelmingly
lower their actual class, with “more than 71 percent deflat[ing] their class position” (ibid:
90). When class was stratified into more categories than working, middle, and uppermiddle class, Americans were even better at identifying their socioeconomic class. This
signified most Americans are “familiar enough with class terminology to place
themselves more or less where experts would put them…” (Hout 2007: 34).

1

I would like to add a word of caution when viewing these numbers as hard-and-fast support for a rising
middle class. The late 1990s and early 2000s were a time of extraordinary growth in the United States
and therefore would see an inflated view of household income and class status.
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A Decline in Class Voting?
Regardless of whether class consciousness is stable or declining, its effect on
American elections is changing. For the most part, theorists agree class-based voting
the United States and in Western European democracies is declining (Heath 1991,
Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995). The ramifications from any change in political behavior in
the United States are monumental, and a decrease in class-based voting is no
exception.
Theorists who use a relative decrease in class voting believe “a modest process
of class secularization probably did occur” (Heath 1991, 78). In this model, theorists
determine vote totals based on how much each class votes for a political party on a
yearly basis. Others scholars use the absolute model of political change, which shows
that a decrease in class voting “definitely occurred.” This model takes a much broader
look at the class system and instead views how much the entire system overall has
changed (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995).
Perhaps the most visible example of supposed declining social class in America
is the decrease in class-based voting. According to the Alford Index of Class Voting,
working class-based voting for Left political parties has declined in every western
country that has available data (Clark and Lipset 1991). The Alford Index of Class
Voting shows what percentage of a given class vote for Left or Right parties. To find the
Alford Index for a country’s Left party among working class voters, subtract the working
class votes for the Right party from the working class votes from the Left party. The
remaining is the Alford Index score (Alford 1962). Other mathematical models show a
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decline in class-based voting as well. Harold Clarke’s Consistency Voting Index is
derived from the Alford Index of Class Voting but takes into account third parties as well
(Clarke’s research focuses primarily on British voters) (Clarke 2004). The Relative Class
Voting Index takes the middle class’s odds of voting for conservative parties divided by
their odds of voting for liberal parties (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985). Regardless of
the model chosen, class-based voting in Western democracies is declining, which can
be seen in the image below.

Figure 2
Class-based Party Support in Britain, 1964-2001

(Clarke 2004)

But, like the disagreement among theorists over the salience of class in
American society and the very definition of class itself, scholars cannot agree what
causes the decrease in class voting. In fact, some do not even believe class voting has
decreased (e.g. Heath 1991).
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Theories that explore a drop in class-based political activity are explained as a
breakup of class-based, political ideology (reminiscent of Marx’s view that “every class
struggle is a political struggle” (Marx and Engels 1948)). Five major theories have
emerged explaining this drop-off, which are outlined below (Goldthorpe and Clark 2001,
Monza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Of course, there are also many theorists who do not
believe that there has been a decline in class-based voting (e.g. Bartels 2006, Pulzer
1987). These theories are presented juxtaposed to the drop-off theories.
First, there is a general “embourgeoisement” of the working class, although it is
mostly an antiquated system of looking at class-based voting decline. That is, as
members of the working class become more skilled, which lead to higher incomes and
living standards, they “assimilate into middle-class society” (Moore 1966, cf. Goldthorpe
1968). Similarly, there is a “proletarianization” of white-collar workers. White-collar
workers, largely members of the middle class, are adopting working class tendencies,
like organizing themselves into labor unions (Jelin 1979). Affecting embourgeoisement
and proletarianization is social mobility and occupational mobility. The more mobile a
society is along these variables, the more likely citizens will be to identify with a middle
class (Turner 1992, Weakliem 1995) or the more likely that they will identify with the
class they are moving toward, rather than the class to which they belong (De Graff,
Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 1995).2 If embourgeoisement and proletarianization affects
modern class consciousness, then Americans are moving toward believing they all
belong to a universal middle class.

2

De Graff, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath find that there is an “acculturation to the class of destination” among
mobile intergenerational groups.
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Although the idea of highly skilled, working class individuals identifying with the
middle class sounds theoretically sound, studies testing embourgeoisement have found
little empirical evidence of its existence. (Goldthorpe 1968, Hamilton 1972). Likewise,
social mobility has not been as strong as hypothesized by theorists who believe in class
decay (Turner 1992). For these empirical reasons, embourgeoisement is seen as an
antiquated way of looking at class-based voting decay.
Second, Americans are moving toward new divisions that are more important in
post-industrial America than class divisions. New “identity” struggles are replacing old
class bonds. These issues include the Gender and Sexual Minorities (GSM) equal rights
movement, regional movements, and gender, race, and ethnicity movements (Laclau
and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). These issues are not new societal divisions but have
become more prominent in recent decades (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).
The idea of issue struggles becoming more prominent in American society than
class is reminiscent of Weber’s “parties” and “communities.” The groups that coalesce
around various social issues and thereby acquire “social power” create communities,
which are not affected by members’ classes. These communities form parties, which
are the groups actively working for change despite opposition (Weber 1946).
This movement does not mean lower classes support redistributive policies less.
In fact, research indicates low--income households were more likely to support welfare
policies than high--income households, including middle class households (Bobo 1991).
Instead, class-based voting is becoming subordinate to other types of stratification.
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The most prominent empirical explanation of class becoming subordinate to
new, social division of society is the impact of race. These theorists claim that race has
begun to take over class as a key element in voting. They use the Deep South as
evidence of this trend, pointing to overwhelming African American support of the
Democrats and majority white support of the Republicans after the civil rights laws in the
1960s. Democrats, they argue have become the party of racial equality, while
Republicans have become the party that looks out for the interests of whites. This party
reclassifying has led to members of every class becoming split between the two parties
(Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991).
However, theorists who claim that there is a continued significance of class in
voting show that race is not a divisive issue among classes. They argue, “Significant
dealignment may have begun in the 1960s as postulated by advocates of the racial
realignment thesis,” but “class voting indexes returned to levels found in the 1950s.”
This trend means that there is no significant dealignment of classes based on racial
dynamics (Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995).
Third, Americans are gradually becoming more educated, which fundamentally
changes how they view themselves. Rather than being constricted to class loyalty, a
more educated American citizenry identifies itself with and makes rational, political
decisions based on an educated opinion. In making this change, Americans make
decisions based on calculative, long-term determinations, rather than collective
identities. (Dalton 2014, Heath 1991)
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No consensus has been reached over the effect of a more educated populace,
however. Although the issue has been explored in depth by researchers, scholars are
unsure what the effects of a more educated populace are. As one scholar bluntly put it,
most data was “still unused” (Smith 1989).
Four, fundamentally, the working class has decreased. As a proportion of the
population, the manual, working class has declined, leaving the traditional left parties to
absorb parts of the middle class, or ultimately, face endless defeat. However, by
attracting middle class voters into the party, they “suffer a loss of opportunities among
narrowly defined workers,” because the parties satisfy only the mutual interests of the
two groups- working class and middle class- and therefore do not satiate the needs of
the working class (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). These supra-class themes drive
down the class-based vote, causing less class-based cleavages (Manza, Hout, and
Brooks 1995). On top of these divisions, some theorists argue that, as new,
international, competitive markets emerge, new fragmentations emerge, as all classes
of declining industries bind together for survival (Logan and Molotch 1987, Offe 1999).
Theorists who disagree with this model argue that Left parties have not lost a
considerable number of votes compared with earlier periods. Since these parties did not
lose votes despite a supposed drop in total working class voters, these parties were
able to sustain their working class votes while incorporating new, middle class votes
(Pulzer 1987). Furthermore, they assert that the new, competitive changes to
international politics have not broken down class barriers and forced agreement among
classes on economic issues (Hibbs 1982). Moreover, accompanying the new,
16

international economy are problems like declining rates of social mobility (Hout 1988),
which will likely lead to more class polarization (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993).
Finally, the traditional, class-based left is being joined by a “New Left,” which is
made up of members of the middle class (Inglehart 1990: 375). This group is made up
of environmentalists, women, racial minorities, and the GSM community, among others.
(Claus 1999) People take economic necessities for granted with an increase in wealth.
Their focus instead turns to “life-style and amenities.” The issues these voters care
about “social issues” rather than “traditional class political issues,” like fighting for
“ownership and control of the means of production.” (Clark and Lipset 1991, 405) These
groups being added to the political calculation muddies the waters, causing the
traditionally united lower class to break apart. This phenomenon is especially relevant in
younger generations, especially with young people from “more affluent and hierarchical
societies.” (Clark and Lipset 1991) Young, middle class people have “postmaterialist”
values, like those touted by the new left, more than older generations. The youth also
focus less on “materialist” concerns more than older generations, issues that typically
made up the bulk of concerns valued by the working class. Therefore, the older, working
class generations, which valued “materialist” concerns and made up the old left, slowly
are being replaced by newer, middle class generations, which emphasize
“postmaterialist” values. These individuals are the most likely to transition from
traditional class-based parties (Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson
1994, Inglehart 1990).
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In a study of 12 Western European states, André Freire found “social factors are
a very important dimension in explaining individual left–right orientation” (Freire 2006:
371). The author performed a regression analysis on issues important to respondents
when determining their position on a left-right spectrum on two surveys in 11 of the
countries and one survey in one. He found “social factors” were the most important
factor in determining left-right orientation in twelve cases, while “partisan orientation”
was the most important factor in only eight of the 23 cases (ibid. 370). Therefore, the
author argues, “‘social identities’ are gaining ground, particularly among the younger
generations,” while “individuals’ positions within the social structure have been...of
decreasing importance in the explanation of their left–right political orientations” (ibid.
372).
This trend can be seen particularly well in portions of the American Midwest.
Thomas Frank describes in “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” that, as hot-button,
“explosive” social issues become more important in the political discourse, working
class, white Americans have been fleeing the Democratic Party in droves, making many
Midwestern states (e.g. Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) among the darkest red
states. However, many Midwesterners’ single-mindedness regarding social issues has
led to state governments passing economic policies that do not benefit most people,
especially those in the working class. Frank postulates his idea can be projected to
social conservatives across the United States. Many social conservatives are from
economically depressed classes and voting for conservative candidates constitutes
voting against their own economic self-interest (Frank 2004).
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Joseph Gerteis (1998) also found social issues are becoming less important for
explaining the differences between the political left and right. In his study of the
fragmentation of the American middle class, Gereis found, “Republican policies have
alienated the party’s traditional middle-class support,” while a similar phenomenon has
“afflicted the left” (ibid: 662). Gerteis’s research points toward a decline in the relevance
of “traditional welfare-state issues,” such as national spending on welfare, for which
Gerteis tested (ibid: 663). Instead, Gerteis’s research indicates toward the growing
importance of social issues in defining how middle class Americans vote.
As Larry Bartels explains in “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with
Kansas?” the idea that socially conservative voters are moving away from the
Democratic Party and becoming more conservative is false. White, working class
support for the Democratic Party has actually increased over the last 20 years. The
ideological views of white, working class individuals have not changed either. In fact,
social issues are less related to party identification than economic issues among
working class voters, although social issues have because more related to voting
preference in middle and upper class white voters (Bartels 2006).
Critics of the New Left theory point to foundational problems with the research
behind it. For example, they point to Ronald Inglehart’s work, who is a prominent postmaterial theorist. In many of his works, Inglehart argues the theory that “new,”
“postmaterial” social movements are overtaking old, “materialist” movements in postindustrial nations. The issues that matter to new generations are shifting away from
“materialist concerns about economic and physical security toward greater emphasis on
19

freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” (Inglehart and Abramson 1994, 336).
He argues, these issues do not appeal to the lower classes, causing the working class
disenfranchisement (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and
Abramson 1994).
But critics point to Inglehart’s definition of postmaterial and material as
problematic. First, the issues that Inglehart points to have not substantially changed in
value to the public. Some scholars have found that material issues have remained
stable and the postmaterial issue changes that have occurred “do not amount to a net
increase in the popularity of these concerns” (Brooks and Manza 1994, 561). Others
have found “there is some evidence that the traditional class division is becoming less
important, but no sign that the postmaterialist dimension is becoming more important
(Weakliem 1991). Regardless of their differences, they both find that Inglehart’s
conclusion is false.
For example, in a study of American mayors in 1991, Clark and Lipset found
“fiscal and social liberalism were virtually unrelated” for mayors of any age. Clark and
Lipset did find, as the mayors got older, the differentiation between fiscal and social
liberalism among French mayors is shrinking, which points to a decline in class voting in
France. However, the results do not hold true for the United States (Clark and Lipset
1991: 405).
Postmaterial issues- such as environmentalism and feminism - appeal to “issues
of personal and societal security.” That is, these issues are designed to boost most
people’s “personal well-being and security.” Take, for example, feminism. Many feminist
20

campaigns push equal pay for equal work, which directly affects material issues. This
idea that these so-called postmaterial issues do not affect material well-being is
incorrect. Not to mention, the idea that these are new movements are insulting to older
generations (Brooks and Manza 1994). These issues have come in waves throughout
the United States’ history: “second wave” feminism came from 19th and 20th century
feminism (e.g. Cott 1987), environmentalism came from the conservation movement
(e.g. Warren 2003), and nuclear disarmament came from previous peace movements
(e.g. Kleidman 1993).
If Americans are beginning to decide political choices based on non-class based
issues, politicians and political campaigns need to respond accordingly. This response
must include a shift away from economic issues and a move toward social issues. For
example, in the 2012 American presidential election, President Obama’s campaign tried
to use Mitt Romney’s “47 percent” comment to encourage working class voters that
Romney did not care about them. The video in which Romney made the remark was
released on September 17, after which the President received no boost in support (Corn
2012). On September 17, the average percentage the President was polling was 48.1
percent, while Romney was at 44 percent. A week later, the President was polling 48.2
percent and Romney polled 44.2 percent, no difference between the days (Huffington
Post 2012).
Hypotheses
My hypotheses for this paper are going to be split into two parts. In the first, I
have three hypotheses. In these, I will to explore how class correlates with basic
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political beliefs, namely political party, ideology, and support for an increase in the
minimum wage. Hopefully, these will set a baseline understanding of class and its
effects. The results of these hypotheses will determine whether the growth of income
inequality has led to a more class-based political system or if the reason for political
beliefs comes from elsewhere.
My first hypothesis is I believe there will be no correlation between political party
preference and self-defined class. Frankly, most of the research about class identity
points to a decrease in the strength of class-based voting in the United States (Crewe
1986, Weakliem 1995). Even among the less numerous scholars who argue in support
of class-based voting, their admittance that class secularization has happened indicates
class-based voting is on the decline (Heath 1991).
My second hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and
political ideology. Similar to political party, I posit there will be no correlation between
political ideology and self-defined class. Since political party and ideology are typically
connected (Highton and Kam 2011), it follows if there is no correlation between political
party and self-defined class, there will be no correlation between political ideology and
class.
My third hypothesis explores the relationship between self-defined class and
support for an increase in the minimum wage. I believe the lower an individual’s selfdefined class, the more likely they will support an increase in the minimum wage to
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$10.10 an hour.3 This hypothesis follows the logic that working class individuals are
more likely to support policies that liberalism’s economic ideals, like raising the
minimum wage (Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991).
In my second set of hypotheses, I will explore how identity politics and
postmaterialism are affecting class-based voting. To do so, I will look at the relationship
between class, race, support for same-sex marriage, and political party in four
hypotheses. If class does not determine political beliefs, these hypotheses will
determine from where Virginians get their political beliefs.
First, I believe people who self-identify as “black” will be more likely to identify
with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who self-identify
as “white” will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than with the
Democratic Party, since Americans are moving in the direction of arranging parties
behind identity strata (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall and Edsall 1991, Laclau and
Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).
Second, I believe people who support same-sex marriage will be more likely to
identify with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party, and people who
oppose same-sex marriage will be more likely to identify with the Republican Party than
with the Democratic Party, since Americans are shifting to arranging parties based off
postmaterial issues instead of class (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992,
Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).

3

The $10.10 per hour is not arbitrary. The number is what minimum wage would be if it had been indexed
at inflation at its peak in the 1960s.
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Third, I hypothesize there will be no correlation between race and support for an
increase in the minimum wage. If identity politics are taking over the old, class-based
politics, then one’s race should not affect how they view economic issues, only their
political party preference (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991). Therefore, race may
affect how one votes, but not their opinion on the minimum wage.
Finally, I believe there will be no correlation between support for same sex
marriage and support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race in my third
hypothesis, postmaterial views should have no effect on materialist issues like the
minimum wage, affecting only vote choice (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart 1992,
Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998). Support for the minimum
wage, therefore, should not be affected by support for same-sex marriage.
Methods
The data I used to test my hypotheses comes from the University of Mary
Washington Center for Leadership and Media Studies Fall 2014 survey of Virginia. The
survey collects a statewide, representative sample of English interviews of 1,000
Virginian adults aged 18 and older, 500 on landline and 500 on cell phone. The full
survey has a margin of error of ±3.5 percent. It was conducted from October 1-6, 2014.
Using data from the University of Mary Washington survey does have some
drawbacks. First, it has a smaller sample size than a nationwide survey. With only 1,000
respondents, it has a considerably smaller pool than, for example, the thousands-large
American National Election Survey. Second, because of the small size of the survey,
there are fewer questions to use to check hypotheses. Third, extrapolating data from
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Virginia to the whole United States is problematic. Granted, Virginia’s political makeup is
similar to the entire United States, voting for the two major party candidates in 2012 by
almost the same margin as the nation as a whole (Federal Election Commission 2013).
However, an argument can be made that Virginia is a miniature United States: lowincome west, agricultural south, industrial southeast, and urban, highly educated North.
Moreover, Virginia has similar racial makeup to the whole United States, 69 percent
white compared to 72 percent white nationally (Farnsworth 2012).
I focused on five questions in the University of Mary Washington survey. For
each question, if the respondent volunteered their own answer, answered “don’t know,”
or refused to answer the question, I dropped them from the study. Thankfully, there
were only 23 people who responded these ways, just 2.3 percent of respondents.
Obviously the reasons why people would not answer about their class or political beliefs
is interesting, but not the purpose of this study.
The first question I focused on was, “Would you say you are: upper class, middle
class, working class, or lower class?” 5.2 percent of Virginians viewed themselves as
members of the upper class, while 45.5 percent, 34.1 percent, and 12.9 percent viewed
themselves as members of the middle, working, and lower class, respectively. I
recalculated the results into two different social classes: the middle class and the
working class. This change left 50.7 percent middle class and 47.0 percent working
class.
The second question I focused on asked “Generally speaking do you consider
yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an independent?” A plurality of Virginians identify
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with the Democratic Party, 35.7 percent. The second most likely response was
independent, at 34.7 percent. Respondents were least likely to identify with the
Republican Party, with just 25.2 percent of Virginians doing so.
The third question deals with respondents’ political ideology. They were asked “In
general, would you describe your political views as very liberal, liberal, moderate,
conservative, or very conservative?” Due to the size of the sample, I chose to condense
this question into a three-part ideology scale, rather than the original five-part ideology
scale. This left me with three groups: liberal, moderate, and conservative. After this
alteration, there were 22.4 percent liberal, 38.2 percent moderate, and 34.4%
conservative.
The fourth question asks respondents about their views on raising the minimum
wage: “Would you support or oppose Congress passing legislation that would raise the
minimum wage in this country from $7.25 per hour to $10.10 per hour?” 67.5 percent of
respondents supported raising the wage to $10.10 per hour, while 30.3 percent
opposed the measure.
The fifth question deals with the respondent’s race, asking, “What is your race?
Are you white, black, Asian, or some other race?” 77 percent of respondents identified
themselves as white, while 18.6 percent identified themselves as black. I chose to limit
discussion to just white and black, because the survey data I used made it impossible to
use other backgrounds. I would have like to use other races, but the small sample size
made that impossible.
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The sixth question asks respondents about their views on the legalization of
same-sex marriage: “Do you favor or oppose allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry
legally in Virginia?” Exactly 50 percent of respondents supported legalizing same-sex
marriage in Virginia, while 42 percent of respondents opposed legalizing same-sex
marriage in Virginia.
Unfortunately, respondents’ views on same-sex marriage are not a perfect
question for determining post-materialism. While many post-material authors mention
same-sex marriage as a contributing factor to the decline in class voting (e.g. Abramson
and Inglehart 1992), same-sex marriage is affected by issues like religiosity, which
skews results. However, I was constrained by questions asked in the poll, and samesex marriage was the best postmaterialist option in the survey.
Analysis
(Table one about here)
To test my first hypothesis in my first set of data exploring basic political beliefs, I
compared people’s self-defined class against their party identification. With a Pearson
Chi-Square significance of .616, these data show that there is not a significant
correlation between respondents’ self-defined class and their political party preference.
My hypothesis was, therefore, correct. I assume this lack of a significant relationship
between these data as meaning postmaterial and identity issues have led to a
breakdown of class-based voting, like scholars have pointed out (Crewe 1986,
Weakliem 1995). Therefore, there must be some other variable that affects how
Virginians choose their political party.
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(Table two about here)
To test my second hypothesis, I compared people’s self-defined class against
their political ideology. Similar to political party, the relationship between self-defined
class and political ideology was not trustworthy, with a Pearson Chi-Square significance
of .234. The lack of correlation proved my hypothesis correct. Again, similar to political
party, the close relationship between political ideology and political party (Highton and
Kam 2011) and the breakdown of class-based party preference as mentioned above
has likely led to this statistical insignificance (Crewe 1986, Weakliem 1995).
(Table three about here)
To test my third hypothesis, I compared people’s self-defined class against their
support for an increase in the minimum wage. Poor people were the most supportive of
the increase, as expected. The data for this hypothesis were statistically significant, with
a Chi-Square significance of .049. The data also have a Cramer’s V value of .064,
meaning they have an extremely weak- but statistically significant- relationship.
However, these data point to the significance of American’s class structure regarding
materialist issues, despite the fact class has no effect on political party preference, as
shown in hypothesis one. The data did prove my hypothesis correct, with a higher
percentage of the working class, 72.7 percent, supporting an increase in the minimum
wage than the middle class, 66.9 percent. These results stem from working class’s
support for the historically liberal tradition of supporting working class economic issues
(Bartels 2006, Brooks and Manza 1994, Weakliem 1991).
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From the data above, we can conclude class correlates neither with political party
nor political ideology, but class does correlate with support for an increase in the
minimum wage. What it does not answer, however, is why Virginians vote the way they
do. My second set of hypotheses hopes to shine some light on this issue.
(Table four about here)
To test my first hypothesis in my second set of hypotheses, I compared
respondents’ race with their political party preference. The result had a near perfect ChiSquare significance, .001, although it had a very strong relationship with a Cramer’s V
value of .461. These data present a significant finding: there is a strong relationship
between an individual’s political party preference and an individual’s race. The results
also proved my hypothesis correct, with African Americans being much more likely to
support the Democratic Party than the Republican Party, and white Americans being
more likely to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 75 percent of
African Americans identified as members of the Democratic Party, while only four
percent identified Republicans. 28 percent of white Americans viewed themselves as
Democrats, while 32 percent identified as Republicans. For this survey, these results
seem to confirm theorists’ observations of a movement to racial, identity-based political
parties, rather than class-based political parties (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, Edsall
and Edsall 1991, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).
(Table five about here)
I found similar results when testing my second hypothesis. For it, I compared the
data for those who support same-sex marriage with the data for political party. The
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results were statistically significant with a Chi Square of .001 and had a very strong
relationship with a Cramer’s V of .288. Similar to race and political party preference,
these results show there is a relationship between postmaterial issues and political
party preference. The results supported my hypothesis, with respondents who support
same-sex marriage being more likely to support the Democratic Party than the
Republican Party, and respondents who oppose same-sex marriage being more likely
to support the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. 44 percent of respondents
who support same-sex marriage identify as Democrats, while only 15 percent of
respondents who support same-sex marriage identify as Republicans. On the other
hand, 41 percent of respondents who oppose same-sex marriage view themselves as
Republicans, while only 28 percent of the same group respondents who oppose samesex marriage view themselves as Democrats. Again, similar to race, these results seem
to confirm theorists’ observations of a movement to postmaterial, identity-based political
parties, rather than class-based political parties (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart
1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).
(Table six about here)
To test my third hypothesis, I compared race with support for the minimum wage.
The data were statistically significant, with a near perfect Chi-Square significance of
.001 and with a weak relationship with a Cramer’s V value of .258, meaning there is a
very strong relationship between these two issues. Unfortunately, these data prove my
hypothesis incorrect. Although both races were overwhelmingly likely to support an
increase in the minimum wage, African Americans in particular supported the measure,
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with 89 percent in support and only 11 percent opposed. Whites also supported an
increase in the minimum wage, but at a lower level than African Americans. 65 percent
of white respondents supported the measure, while 36 percent opposed it. These
results were surprising, considering research did not allude to race having an effect on
materialist issues (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Heath 1991).
(Table seven about here)
For my fourth and final hypothesis, I compared support for same sex marriage
with support for an increase in the minimum wage. Similar to race and support for an
increase in the minimum wage, the results were statistically significant, with a near
perfect significance of .001. These results also had a strong relationship, with a
Cramer’s V value of .179. These data disprove my hypothesis. Again, people were
overwhelmingly in support of increasing the minimum wage; however those who
supported same-sex marriage were more likely to support increasing the minimum
wage than those who oppose same-sex marriage. 77 percent of those who support
same-sex marriage support increasing the minimum wage versus 60 percent of those
who do not support same-sex marriage. These results contradict postmaterialist
theories, which never indicate a relationship between support for same-sex marriage
and support for increasing the minimum wage (Freire 2006, Abramson and Inglehart
1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994, Inglehart 1990, Gerteis 1998).
This project attempted to test the why the last two hypotheses contradicted the
literature using the data, but the data came back statistically insignificant. For example, I
took the same variables from my third hypothesis in my second set (race and support
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for an increase in the minimum wage) and controlled for class. If I had been able to
show that working class African Americans were more likely to support the minimum
wage than upper class African Americans and working class whites were more likely to
support the minimum wage than upper class whites, then the above point would have
been moot. Unfortunately though, the data were insignificant.
Discussion and Conclusion
From my data there arises a very clear conclusion: for Virginians at least, class
does not affect people’s voting habits the way past scholars here hypothesized class
impacted United States politics. Class voting is minimal, with the data showing there is
not a significant relationship between classes and voting behaviors anymore. Voting
decisions, like political party preference, therefore, must come from other places
instead.
However, class does still matter for some issues. It still matters for materialist
issues like support for the minimum wage, which continues to have its highest support
from the lower classes. Second, while there is no correlation between class and political
party preference, there is a connection between race and same-sex marriage and class
and political party preference. This relationship is likely due to a rise in postmaterial
ideals among Americans when choosing political parties, as illustrated by some
theorists (Inglehart 1990, Abramson and Inglehart 1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994,
Heath 1991).
However, the discussion does not stop there. There are a number of other issues
that arise from these data. First, the bulk of data relating to the class-based politics is
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decades old, most of it coming from the early 1990s. Presumably, the United States has
changed since then. Of course, the reason for the lack of recent research could come
from the lack of correlation between class and voting patterns, but I think more attention
should be paid to the reason Americans are voting against their economic self-interest.
The United States is changing, after all. With the rise in income inequality, materialist
issues could become more important in the future, meaning us, as political scientists,
cannot let this issue lie fallow.
Second, the conclusions I draw here could be expanded if a nationwide survey is
used. While it is useful to understand why people are not voting on class lines in
Virginia, an explanation for the entire United States would be even more useful.
Moreover, although Virginia may be similar to a smaller United States, it has some
differences from the entire nation as well. For example, Virginia is a so-called “right to
work” state, meaning union membership is not compulsory if workers vote to organize.
This anti-union law could affect how working class Virginians view politics.
Third, the University of Mary Washington poll, while it did provide me with an
excellent data set for Virginia, was missing some elements that could have added to my
project. For example, the only postmaterial question I was able to study was the
question about support for same-sex marriage. While support for same-sex marriage is
one of the key elements of postmaterialism, there are other nuances that affect how one
views same-sex marriage, like one’s religion and religiosity. Unfortunately, there were
no questions about religion in the University of Mary Washington survey, so I was not
able to control for religion. It would also have been beneficial to have other options for
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postmaterial issues as well. The University of Mary Washington poll did not have
questions dealing with women’s issues, the environment, or other postmaterial issues.
These issues could have shed more light on the effects of postmaterialism.
Fourth, the theories do not account for longitudinal fluctuations caused by income
inequality in the United States, which could raise the amount of class-based political
party preference. It would be intriguing to see how the data have changed over time,
and to see whether the class-based party data have dropped drastically. These data
would be particularly interesting to see considering the meteoric rise in inequality
(Dadush 2012). Also interesting to see would be to see the longitudinal effects of
postmaterial and race on class. If Americans are increasingly forming dichotomous
opinions on these issues, then the arguments would be even stronger.
Finally, and most importantly, there is much more research that needs to be done
to find how people arrive at their political beliefs and with which political party they
identify. Although some of my data point to postmaterial issues being the an important
reason why people identify with their political party, the analysis of my third and fourth
hypotheses in my second set of hypotheses point to larger picture. If postmaterial
issues were the sole determinant of political party preference, there should be no
relationship between postmaterial issues and material issues. However, both the
relationship between race and support for minimum wage and the relationship between
support for same-sex marriage and support for minimum wage were significant. Not
only that, these policies also line up with the views of the Democratic Party, which leads
me to question whether people’s political views could be affected by their party
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preference. That is, party preference, race, postmaterial issues, and class all weave an
intricate web that creates Americans political beliefs.
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Appendix
Table 1:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Self-Identified Class *
Political Party

Missing

Percent
939

N

93.9%

Total

Percent
61

N

6.1%

Percent

1000

100.0%

Self-Identified Class * Political Party Crosstabulation
Political Party
Democratic Independent Republican
Self-Identified
Class

Middle
Class

Working
Class

Total

171

Total

132

132

171

483

35.4%

27.3%

27.3%

35.4%

100.0%

50.1%

54.1%

54.1%

50.1%

51.4%

18.2%

14.1%

14.1%

18.2%

51.4%

170

112

112

170

456

37.3%

24.6%

24.6%

37.3%

100.0%

49.9%

45.9%

45.9%

49.9%

48.6%

18.1%
Count

11.9%
341

11.9%
244

18.1%
341

48.6%
939

% within Self-Identified
Class

36.3%

26.0%

36.3%

100.0%

% within Political Party

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

36.3%

26.0%

36.3%

100.0%

% of Total
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df
a

.968
.969
.031
939

2
2
1

.616
.616
.861

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 118.49.
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

Phi

.032

.616

Cramer's V

.032
939

.616
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Table 2:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N

Missing
Percent

Self-Identified Class *
Political Ideology

932

N

93.2%

Total

Percent
68

N

6.8%

1000

Percent
100.0%

Self-Identified Class * Political Ideology Crosstabulation
Political Ideology
Liberal
Self-Identified
Class

2.00

Count

3.00

Conservative

Total

122

201

168

491

% within SubClass2part1

24.8%

40.9%

34.2%

100.0%

% within ideo2

55.2%

53.9%

49.7%

52.7%

% of Total

13.1%

21.6%

18.0%

52.7%

Count

Total

Moderate

99

172

170

441

% within SubClass2part1

22.4%

39.0%

38.5%

100.0%

% within ideo2

44.8%

46.1%

50.3%

47.3%

% of Total
Count

10.6%
221

18.5%
373

18.2%
338

47.3%
932

% within SubClass2part1
% within ideo2
% of Total

23.7%

40.0%

36.3%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

23.7%

40.0%

36.3%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df
a

1.983
1.983
1.800
932

2
2
1

.371
.371
.180

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 104.57.
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

Phi

.046

.371

Cramer's V

.046
932

.371
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Table 3:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Self-Identified Class *
Minimum Wage

Missing

Percent
957

N

Total

Percent

95.7%

43

N

4.3%

Percent

1000

100.0%

Self-Identified Class * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation
Minimum Wage
Support
Self-Identified
Class

Middle
Class

Working
Class

Total

Count

Oppose

Total

331

164

495

% within Self-Identified
Class

66.9%

33.1%

100.0%

% within Minimum Wage

49.6%

56.6%

51.7%

% of Total

34.6%

17.1%

51.7%

Count

336

126

462

% within Self-Identified
Class

72.7%

27.3%

100.0%

% within Minimum Wage

50.4%

43.4%

48.3%

% of Total
Count

35.1%
667

13.2%
290

48.3%
957

% within Self-Identified
Class

69.7%

30.3%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

69.7%

30.3%

100.0%

% within Minimum Wage
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
b
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

3.883
3.611
3.893

a

1
1
1

.049
.057
.048

3.879

1

.049

Exact Sig. (2sided)

.049

N of Valid Cases

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.029

957

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 140.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V

N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

-.064

.049

.064
957

.049
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Table 4:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Race * Political Party

Missing
Percent

796

N

79.6%

Total

Percent
204

N

20.4%

Percent
1000

100.0%

Race * Political Party Crosstabulation
Political Party
Democratic
Race

White

Black

Total

Count

Republican

Independent

Total

146

220

249

615

% within Race

23.7%

35.8%

40.5%

100.0%

% within Political Party

51.8%

96.9%

86.8%

77.3%

% of Total

18.3%

27.6%

31.3%

77.3%

136

7

38

181

% within Race

75.1%

3.9%

21.0%

100.0%

% within Political Party

48.2%

3.1%

13.2%

22.7%

% of Total
Count

17.1%
282

0.9%
227

4.8%
287

22.7%
796

Count

% within Race
% within Political Party

35.4%

28.5%

36.1%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

35.4%

28.5%

36.1%

100.0%

% of Total
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df
a

168.935
176.007
98.199
796

2
2
1

.001
.001
.001

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 51.62.
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

Phi

.461

.001

Cramer's V

.461
796

.001
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Table 5:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Same-Sex
Marriage *
Political Party

Missing

Percent
888

N

88.8%

Total

Percent
112

N

11.2%

Percent

1000

100.0%

Same-Sex Marriage * Political Party Crosstabulation
Political Party
Democratic
SameSupport Count
Sex
% within Same-Sex
Marriage
Marriage

Oppose

Total

Republican Independent

Total

214

74

198

486

44.0%

15.2%

40.7%

100.0%

% within Political
Party

65.8%

31.2%

60.7%

54.7%

% of Total

24.1%

8.3%

22.3%

54.7%

111

163

128

402

% within Same-Sex
Marriage

27.6%

40.5%

31.8%

100.0%

% within Political
Party

34.2%

68.8%

39.3%

45.3%

% of Total
Count

12.5%
325

18.4%
237

14.4%
326

45.3%
888

% within Same-Sex
Marriage

36.6%

26.7%

36.7%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

36.6%

26.7%

36.7%

100.0%

Count

% within Political
Party
% of Total
Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df
a

73.810
74.659
1.696
888

2
2
1

.001
.001
.193

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 107.29.
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

Phi

.288

.001

Cramer's V

.288
888

.001
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Table 6:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Race * Minimum Wage

Missing
Percent

809

N

Total

Percent

80.9%

191

N

19.1%

Percent
1000

100.0%

Race * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation
Minimum Wage
Support
Race

White

Black

Total

Count

Oppose

Total

372

251

623

% within Race

59.7%

40.3%

100.0%

% within Minimum Wage

69.3%

92.3%

77.0%

% of Total

46.0%

31.0%

77.0%

165

21

186

% within Race

88.7%

11.3%

100.0%

% within Minimum Wage

30.7%

7.7%

23.0%

% of Total
Count

20.4%
537

2.6%
272

23.0%
809

Count

% within Race
% within Minimum Wage

66.4%

33.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

66.4%

33.6%

100.0%

% of Total

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
b
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

53.971
52.679
61.928

a

1
1
1

.001
.001
.001

53.904

1

.001

N of Valid Cases

Exact Sig. (2sided)

.001

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.001

809

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 62.54.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal

Phi
Cramer's V

N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

-.258

.001

.258
809

.001
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Table 7:

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Same-Sex Marriage
* Minimum Wage

Missing
Percent

901

N

90.1%

Total

Percent
99

N

9.9%

Percent

1000

100.0%

Same-Sex Marriage * Minimum Wage Crosstabulation
Minimum Wage
Support
SameSupport
Sex
Marriage

Oppose

Total

Count

Oppose

Total

377

113

490

% within SameSex Marriage

76.9%

23.1%

100.0%

% within Minimum
Wage

60.3%

40.9%

54.4%

% of Total

41.8%

12.5%

54.4%

248

163

411

% within SameSex Marriage

60.3%

39.7%

100.0%

% within Minimum
Wage

39.7%

59.1%

45.6%

% of Total
Count

27.5%
625

18.1%
276

45.6%
901

% within SameSex Marriage

69.4%

30.6%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

69.4%

30.6%

100.0%

Count

% within Minimum
Wage
% of Total

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
b
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

df

28.980
28.204
28.990

a

1
1
1

.001
.001
.001

28.947

1

.001

Exact Sig. (2sided)

.001

N of Valid Cases

Exact Sig. (1sided)

.001

901

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 125.90.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Symmetric Measures
Value
Nominal by Nominal
N of Valid Cases

Approx. Sig.

Phi

.179

.001

Cramer's V

.179
901

.001
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